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The Need for Collaboration Between 
 Ordnance Manufacturers and UXO  
     Clean-up Personnel
The ability to locate unexploded ordnance remotely and accurately increases the safety and efficiency 
of clearance efforts. To achieve maximum effectiveness, UXO manufacturers and removal groups 
should coordinate resources and information to create new and practical technologies to assist 
in efforts to identify failure rates and prevent civilian casualties. The Lost Puppy Proposal is one 
example of a life-saving technology that could result from such collaboration.
by Jack Imber [ Imber Demining International ]
Long-term danger from unexploded ordnance is a ma-jor concern for our generation and future generations. As war and military training continues, the number 
of munitions used increases, resulting in increased UXO con-
tamination. As new ordnance is deployed, mine action com-
panies will likely fall even further behind in clearance efforts, 
leading to more threats from explosive remnants of war to ci-
vilians and a further reduction in useable land.
ERW causes casualties and prevents land usage long after 
war is over. For example, in the 32 years (1975–2007) follow-
ing the end of the Vietnam War, the Ministry of Labor, In-
valids and Social Affairs in Vietnam reported that landmine 
and ERW-related incidents killed 38,849 people and injured 
65,852 in Vietnam.1,2 The total number remains unknown, due 
to the absence of a nationwide casualty-data collection system. 
According to the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, in 
2011 there were 31 reported casualties (14 killed/17 injured) 
and in 2010, there were 42 casualties (8 killed/34 injured).2
These casualties are reminders that ordnance life cycles do 
not always end at military deployment. If ordnance fails to ex-
plode as planned against military targets, it may later explode 
on civilian or explosive ordnance disposal contact, resulting 
in noncombatant casualties.
Contemporary civilian mine-clearance initiatives began 
in the late 1990s, in part with MAG’s (Mine Advisory Group) 
survey efforts in Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawal.3 Only 
recently has traditional thought involving the use and subse-
quent failures of deployed ordnance shifted. Since UXO decay 
leaves behind explosive, chemical, biological and/or nuclear 
hazards, as well as heavy metal residue, failed ordnance is con-
sidered hazardous waste.4 
Ordnance manufacturers have not been held account-
able like other manufacturers that produce hazardous waste. 
Ordnance consumers—militaries and nation states—bear re-
sponsibility for failed ordnance if they are used contrary to 
the specifications for the product given by the manufacturer. 
However, if munitions are used in line with the manufactur-
er’s specifications, and their failure rates are higher in the field 
than in testing, the manufacturer should be held accountable. 
At this point, there is no accurate recording of actual failure 
rates in the field, and thus this reality is not clearly known.
As any failure may result in post-conflict civilian casu-
alties, even “acceptable” rates that are within the purchase 
specifications require swift and effective remediation. The ab-
sence of sufficient recording of field failure rates has contrib-
uted to the largely undocumented deployment of ordnance 
globally over the last century. In addition munitions have 
been dumped or abandoned following conflict. This points 
to the reality that current methods of location, identification 
and disposal must evolve in order to progress toward efficient 
land clearance.
Collaboration Across Sectors
The primary goal of a weapons manufacturer is efficiency: 
Munitions should be safe for the handler and do what they are 
supposed to do with minimal failure rates. Exact failure rates 
in real world conditions, historically and currently, are large-
ly unknown. The results seen in testing ordnance are signifi-
cantly better than the wide variance seen in actual field rates. 
Where this is not the result of variant factors in the field, UXO 
contamination remains from ordnance that failed to perform 
to standard, that is, failed to explode as intended.
Ordnance manufacturers need to know overall failure 
rates in the field, beyond the limits of their testing. Subse-
quent reporting of clearance efforts is one of the only ways 
manufacturers/users can verify failure rates. Knowing these 
failure rates will help manufacturers improve their product, 
and eventually reduce these rates. As a result, cooperation be-
tween manufacturers and UXO-clearance companies is the 
next logical step to achieving increased efficiency and safety.
Manufacturers and clearance companies are related by 
their work with ordnance. The absence of manufacturers in 
the clearance process is problematic and contributes to con-
tamination challenges today. Collaboration between ord-
nance manufacturers and clearance firms may lead to the 
following outcomes, which would benefit all parties involved:
1. Decreased failure rates and thus increased effectiveness
2.  Increased safety protocols for handlers and remediation 
teams
3.  Limited hazardous waste from failed ordnance
4.  Decreased casualties from failed ordnance
5.  Increased avenues to analyze effectiveness of copycat 
munitions systems not subject under law to the same 
scrutiny as original models
6.  Decreased long-term expenses, as clean-up time and ef-
fort would be greatly reduced
Manufacturers and clearance personnel have been engaged 
in dialogue while attending various conferences. By attend-
ing each other’s conferences, understanding of perspectives 
will improve and may develop into effective and collaborative 
clearance strategies beneficial to all affected parties. By ex-
panding existing technologies and collaborating in clearance 
efforts, ordnance manufacturers and UXO-clearance person-
nel may make a post-conflict country safer within a matter of 
months rather than several decades.
Lost Puppy Proposal
A potential solution that may effectively address the in-
ability of manufacturers to detect failure rates and facilitate 
clean-up efforts is a theoretical concept referred to as the Lost 
Puppy Proposal. To facilitate the collection of failed ord-
nance, or “lost puppies,” a radio-frequency identification mi-
crochip would be placed in both the ordnance and the fuze at 
the time of manufacture. After deployment of the ordnance, 
personnel would be able to locate the chip from a distance 
within any UXO with a compatible detector. The detector re-
ceives a numbered code from the chip, which corresponds to 
information in a secured database that identifies the item for 
the UXO technician and suggests how best to deactivate it. 
Similarly, most commercial explosives are required to have 
“taggets” or other labeling processes so that origins of explo-
sives may be identified when used in commission of a crime. 
Even if involved military or national actors would not agree to 
share render-safe procedures with appointed clearance teams, 
the tool would still be useful as it would significantly ease ef-
forts to locate UXO and would facilitate UXO identification 
and the calculation of failure rates.
Potentially, manufacturers would adopt this procedure 
once their customers—i.e., nation states—require it. This pro-
posal’s implementation is dependent upon the collaboration 
and cooperation between manufacturers, state actors and 
UXO-clearance technicians. The specific process, technolo-
gy and databases will evolve through needed communication 
and understanding of the processes required in each field.
Accountability, responsibility and profitability will be key 
components of the process:
1. Accountability: identifying ordnance that failed to func-
tion, tracking transfers, identifying unused stockpiles of 
munitions 
2. Responsibility: following international humanitarian 
laws, preventing hazardous waste in the environment, 
clearing post-conflict countries
3. Profitability: developing more efficient technologies, re-
ducing ordnance failure rates, increasing efficiency and 
decreasing cost of clearance
Assorted unexploded ordnance. What are they? What lies 
beneath them?
Photo courtesy of the author.
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The increased cost of production to 
implement this procedure is transferred 
directly to the customer, as are all costs 
of manufacturing. Controlled testing of 
a prototype technology is the best way 
to prove the economic viability of this 
process. Once developed, increasing the 
volume will decrease the cost. Addition-
ally, as this technology will significantly 
ease clean up, it will pay for itself many 
times over through the reduced need for 
surveys, EOD clearance teams, victim 
assistance, mine risk education, etc.
As the ordnance consumer becomes 
familiar with these new protocols of co-
operation, certain advantages could be 
gained from tactical and safety perspec-
tives. For example, with the proposed 
radio detection chip and the correct de-
tector, quickly assessing the contamina-
tion level of a carpet-bombed battlefield 
of cluster munitions would be possible 
before sending in a military unit. Sta-
tistically, individual bomblets have ex-
tremely high failure rates and create a 
situation similar to scatterable land-
mines. Another advantage of the pro-
posal is that EOD units responding 
to improvised explosive devices may 
be able to remotely locate and identify 
a piece of ordnance used as the main 
charge of a booby trap, a major safety 
advantage.
Using this protocol, which en-
ables clearance teams to gather fail-
ure rates and facilitates clearance, the 
military can discover which ordnance 
companies deliver the best performing 
products. This information will help de-
termine who will obtain contracts and 
ultimately who will assist the military 
in performing its operations efficient-
ly. The collaboration between ordnance 
manufacturers and UXO clearance per-
sonnel can help all parties reach goals 
with greater efficiency and, more im-
portantly, save innocent lives.
Where We Are Today
The Lost Puppy Proposal is very 
timely. Recent advances in microships 
with radio-frequency technologies, to 
aid in post-deployment detection, may 
be suitable for installation in newly 
manufactured ordnance. The micro-
chip currently is used for inventory of 
ordnance and nuclear-facility equip-
ment. The technology used in the mi-
crochip and detection system has been 
promoted as explosive- and fuze-safe. It 
can be easily detected at length through 
metal and water, should withstand the 
rigors of deployment and can pass the 
very crucial Hazards of Electromagnetic 
Radiation to Ordnance (HERO) stan-
dards.5 Including microchip technology 
in munitions could contribute to
1. Quickly locating failed and haz-
ardous weapons in the field
2. Identifying UXO items before 
excavation begins
3. Efficiently eliminating harm to 
civilian populations 
UXO professionals worldwide ac-
knowledge the concept of Lost Puppy as 
a possible and viable solution. It was pre-
sented at the 2011 Parari ordnance con-
ference centered on safety in Brisbane, 
Australia, to ordnance manufacturers 
and those involved in UXO remedia-
tion.6 While questions remain about the 
implementation of such protocol, the 
consensus at this conference was over-
whelmingly positive for the need of a 
similar solution and for dialogue be-
tween related industries. 
See endnotes page 65.
Operation Lost Puppy Proposal—Maximum Accountability of Explosives (MAX).
Drawing and photo courtesy of Julie Pollock.
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Darfur: Baseline KAPB Survey
This article summarizes the first baseline Knowledge, Attitudes, Practices and Beliefs Survey 
conducted in Darfur since 2003. The purpose of the survey was to gain a better understanding 
of the knowledge, attitudes, practices and beliefs of the at-risk population in Darfur regarding 
explosive remnants of war, and to evaluate aspects of transfer of knowledge, use of mass media 
and surveillance mechanisms.
On the initiative of the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) Ordnance Disposal Office the first Knowledge, 
Attitudes, Practices and Beliefs Survey since 2003 was con-
ducted in 2011–2012 in Darfur to assist with the annual 
work plan. The KAPB survey was developed and implement-
ed in close cooperation with National Mine Action Centre 
Sudan, UNICEF, MineTech International and the two nation-
al nongovernmental organizations, the Friends of Peace and 
Development Organization and JASMAR Human Security 
Organization (formerly known as the Sudanese Association 
for Combating Landmines).
The KAPB study’s main purpose was to acquire a baseline 
and direction for the risk education program in order to bet-
ter adapt risk education to the local context and needs. Under 
the supervision of UNAMID Ordnance Disposal Office and 
NMAC Sudan, a total of 1,671 persons (893 female/778 male; 
745 children/926 adults) of different subgroups (students, no-
mads/herders, farmers, teachers, community leaders, work-
ers, etc.) were interviewed between May and July 2012 in 29 
different villages and internally displaced persons camps in 
North, South and West Darfur.
The results of this first baseline KAPB study provided use-
ful information and highlighted several gaps to be addressed 
by risk-education stakeholders working in Darfur. 
Background
In 2003, the Darfur conflict devastated western Sudan’s 
Darfur region, an area with approximately 7.5 million people 
of different ethnic groups and covering about 493,180 sq km 
(190,418 sq mi). As a result of persistent violence and fight-
ing, many people fled their homes; estimates indicate the 
number of IDPs is 2.2 million.1 Due to ongoing fighting, ex-
plosive remnants of war continue to pose a significant threat 
to the safety and security of residents, displaced and return-
ing populations. 
by Beatrice Winkler and Shaza Ragab [ UNAMID ]
In Darfur, mine action work largely focuses on disposing 
unexploded ordnance. The changing situation of the Darfur 
conflict implies high risk of recontamination wherever fighting 
occurs regardless of previous clearance efforts. UXO, such as 
mortars, rockets, aerially delivered bombs and grenades, pose 
a high risk to the individual in terms of casualty and lethal-
ity radius due to the large amount of explosives and the frag-
mentation effect. The reported UXO accidents also involved 
children, usually boys. In 2011, 122 mine/UXO casualties (32 
killed/90 injured) were reported in Sudan.2 
Since 2007, risk education teams from two local NGOs, 
FPDO and JASMAR Human Security Organization, have 
worked in Darfur under the coordination of the UNAMID 
Ordnance Disposal Office, NMAC Sudan and UNICEF.3,4 
They work to raise awareness of ERW dangers among com-
munities and displaced populations by providing community 
and school-based risk education through various training and 
public-information activities.
KAPB interview in Abu Gabina, West Darfur.
Photo courtesy of Adnan Osman Hassan/JASMAR.
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